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Passwords are a commonly used method of access control for computer
systems. Traditional passwords have been found to be inadequate. Passwords are
generated from two sources: users and computer systems. User-selected passwords are
easy to remember, but they might be easily guessed and therefore yield a lower degree
of security. System-generated passwords usually offer a higher degree of security, but
they are hard to remember and therefore meet with high user resistance. Because of
this user resistance, password systems are either circumvented or not used. A solution
to this tradeoff between memorability and security is a security mechanism that is
easily remembered, user friendly, hard to guess and yields a high degree of security.
Cognitive passwords offer these advantages. They are based on a series of
predetemiined questions with answers known normally only by a specific user.
Research into the underlying theory, types of applicable questions and implementation
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A. THE NEED TO PROTECT COMPUTER RESOURCES
Concerns of privacy, proprietary interests, administrative confidentiality and, in
the military, national security are considerations in the development of computer
security systems. (Barton, et al., 1984)
Computer resources are vulnerable to compromise and attack for four reasons:
1. hardware may contain capabilities not originally designed,
2. an operating system may contain errors or capabilities that allow a user to
deceive or circumvent a security system,
3. a security mechanism may contain errors or capabilities that can be exploited
or circumvented,
4. poor password systems may lead to guessing of passwords by system intruders.
(Kaiser, 1987)
The penalties for inadequate computer security are severe. Consequences of
intmsion may include alteration, disclosure or loss of data of an entire system.
Statistical evidence indicates that most unauthorized access attempts go unnoticed. One
out of 100 computer crimes is detected. Of those crimes detected, one out of 22,000
is prosecuted. Of the computer crimes prosecuted, one out of thirty three leads to a
conviction. (Hagopian, 1987)
Computer security range'; from physical securiiA- of huilding<; housing computer
facilities to authentication of persons attempting to use specific application programs.
The National Computer Security Center (NCSC). charged with the responsibility of
designing computer security systems for the United States government, equates security
with tmstworthiness (Kaiser, 1987). TTie NCSC defuies trustworthiness as having four
characteristics:
1. a security mechanism is fully integrated into the fiber of a computer system;
2. a system is robust, well-behaved and understandable;
3. a security mechanism is software-managed and hardware-enforced;
4. any change to an access permissions matrix is immediately enforced.
(Kaiser, 1987)
The development of networks created the capability to communicate remotely with
other computers. Physical restrictions no longer were adequate. Additional security
mechanisms were needed to ensure the availability of widely dispersed systems while
at the same time ensuring that only authorized i>eople could gain access. Physical
boundaries were replaced by electronic boundaries. A secondary security mechanism,
passwords, came to the forefront. Passwords were thought to be inexpensive, easy to
use and provide a level of assurance that the user was indeed authorized to use a
computer system. Through the years, passwords were found to be lacking. Passwords
that yielded a high degree of security were found to be hard to remember. Conversely,
passwords that were easy to remember were found to yield a low degree of security
(Barton, et al.,1984).
A continuing search for a better password system has led to the development of
cognitive password*?. TTiis thesis focuses on the feasibility, advantages, disadvantages
and problems inherent in the use of cognitive passwords as a security' mechanism.
After investigating the characteristics of the cognitive password approach and comparing
them to the characteristics of the traditional password af)proach, a prototype will be
developed to test and demonstrate the concepts and knowledge resulting from this
investigation.
II. COMPUTER SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW
A. BACKGROUND
1. Computer Security: Definition
Computer security is a comprehensive strategy to protect and safeguard
resources (Wood, 1983). Protective measures take the following sequence:
1. protect terminal locations;
2. limit the users that can activate a terminal through use of terminal keys;
3. use passwords to control user access;
4. use passwords to limit access to data resources;
5. require additional passwords for specific resources, such as programs and
databases;
6. provide extra protection for sensitive data through encryption
(Ahituv, et al., 1987).
Computer-based information systems are comprised of six major categories
of resources: hardware, software, communication facilities, data, information and people.
Each of these resources, either singularly or in combination, may be vulnerable
themselves or be the means by which compromise is achieved.
Two general approaches may be used in developing a security system: all
resource*; are protected or no re<:onrre<; are protected unless of a critical nanire
(Wood, 1983). Some information managers emphasize the value of computer hardware
rather than the value of the information stored in the system (Wood, 1983).
2. Protection Versus Accessibility
At one extreme, a security system might limit access to only one or two
people. However, the benefit of information availability organization-wide would be
lost. The net result would be a secure but useless system. At the other extreme, if
no protection is afforded, accessibility would be high but system security would be
lost. Computer securit>' must be balanced berv\'een protection and accessibility. Figure










Two additional considerations of the protection versus accessibility tradeoff
are cost and effect on the organization. As the degree of security rises, the complexity
of protection increases, adding to costs. The cost of a secure system must be evaluated
against the importance of the computer resource that is being protected. If the loss of
a computer system could threaten the survivability of an organization, more funds are
likely to be spent to protect the system. If, on the other hand, the loss of a system
would have minimal effect, an organization may elect to implement only basic security
measures.
The impact of the security system on an organization's personnel wUl also
be important to an organization. Paans and Herschberg (1987) draw a correlation
between security and the happiness of personnel. They indicate that implementation
of security measures is viewed as the withdrawal of privileges and may even lead to
potential sabotage. People can no longer enter certain areas without permission. In
addition, they can not browse through databases unless they are specifically authorized
access. Hagopian (1987) identifies four ways in which computer security will affect an
organization:
1. additional job responsibilities are assigned causing possible organizational
friction;
2. the security system makes sign-on more difficult;
3. access to resources are restricted;
4. the rhr»ire of \vhii"h terminnl to u<:p will he fPtinced.
3. Types of Risk Exposure
Exposure represents possible loss or harm. Vulnerability is a weakness that







6. intentional destruction (Fisher, 1984).
Disclosure, the sharing of information; modification, the changing of
information and destmction, the elimination of information, require special control
measures. Tlirough security control measures, the exposures or vulnerabilities can be
prevented, detected and corrected (Fisher, 1984). Pfleeger (1989) categorizes
vulnerabilities into four threats:
1. interruption, an asset becomes lost, unavailable or unusable;
2. interception, an unauthorized party gains access;
3. modification, someone tampers with an asset;
4. fabrication, creation of spurious transactions.
4. CAUSES OF EXPOSURES
Fisher (1984) states six major causes of exposure: people, hardware,
software, communications, procedures and acts of God.
a. People
Through curiosity or malicious intent, p>eople are a major cause of
exposure.
b. Hardware
Hardware-related exposures may be caused by inadequate or incorrect
microcoding causing a legitimate request for information to yield an unauthorized set
of information.
c. Software
The use of software to reveal information is probably the second
major cause of exposures. During software development, a common practice is to
implement specific ways for a developer to quickly gain access to certain segments of
a program. These quick-entr>' mechanisms or "back doors" may not be completely
eliminated before a program is released to users, allowing intruders to gain access to
and modify original code.
d. Communications
With the proliferation of personal computers and their ability to
communicate with other computer systems from anywhere in the world, the complexity
of communications security is a significant problem No longer can a security manager
confidently establish boundaries around a system. Any p)erson with a personal
computer, a modem, a communications package and some knowledge of an authorized
password can gain access to a system.
e. Procedures
Procedures that have been poorly thought out can have detrimental
effects. A payroll department procedure that allows the same employee to enter
personnel into the payroll system and to authorize payroll checks may result in checks
being issued to nonexistent personnel.
/. Acts of God
Acts of God include natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes or
fires and can result in the loss of facilities and data. Backup and recovery procedures
plus establishment of a geographically separated secondary' facility can alleviate these
possibilities.
5. SUMMARY
Figure 2-2 summarizes the relationships between causes and types of














B. METHODS OF DEFENSE
Protection of computer-based information systems may be thought of as a layered
approach. Each layer uses a different methodology to address the problems unique to
that particular layer. The synergism of multiple layers may create a security system
that protects its resources.
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1. Types of Defenses
Hsiao, Kerr and Madnick (1979) delineate five types of defenses: op)erational
security, physical security, hardware security, cryptographic transformations and
operating system security.
a. Operational Security
The broad category of operational security encompasses two major
areas: operating environment and authorization control (Hsiao, et al., 1979).
(1) Operating Environment. An operating environment is defined
in terms of the degree of access allowed to a computer system. Three possibilities
exist: closed, open or unlimited (Hsiao, et al., 1979). In a closed system only a few
users have access. In an open system, any person can gain access by identifying
himself or herself personally to another person authorized to grant access. In an
unlimited environment, any person can gain access with little effort.
(2) Authorization Control. Authority to grant access to a system
can be divided into three categories; centralized, hierarchial decentralized and individual
(Hsiao, et al., 1979). Under centralized control, a person or department controls who
is granted authorization. In hierarchial decentralization, functional managers have the
power to grant access for specific areas under their control. The complete
decentralization of control results in individual control: an owner of information is
responsible to control access to it.
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Authorization control or authentication can take many forms
from passwords to the confirmation of biological traits. Various types of authorization
control are discussed later in this paper.
b. Physical Security
Physical security encompasses acts of God, man-made disasters and
intrusion (Hsiao, et al., 1979). Acts of God, such as fires and floods, may be
controlled by installation of sensors and automatic suppressant systems such as a
HALON 1211 fire fighting system. Man-made disasters or equipment failures such as
a disk head crash can be minimized through a backup and recovery system. Intrusion,
either intentional or unintentional, is a primary concern of physical security. Prior to
the proliferation of network communications systems, avoiding intrusion meant keeping
a person from physically entering a computer facility. With the current ability to
access a computer through remote terminals, physical security must now be concerned
with preventing access through communications media. Cipher locks, identification
cards £ind door monitors are examples of tools used for physical security.
c. Hardware Security
Closely related to the design of hardware is the design of the
hardware security system. Various hardware components require protection from both
the user and computer applications or processes desiring to use the hardware resources.




A different approach to security is the encoding of user access
information. The underlying assumption is that intruders will be able to gain access.
Rather than try to prevent access, emphasis is placed on encrypting or scrambling the
data making it unusable by outsiders (Hsiao, et al., 1979). Data that can not be
interpreted are of little value. Tools commonly used are encryption and decryption
algorithms.
e. Operating System Security
An operating system is the master program that controls the execution
of all other processes and stays resident in main memory. Prior to the running of an
application program, an operating system must be executed. An op>erating system acts
as the mediator between competing processes and allocates resources based on
demands. Gaining access to an operating system can lead to access of other programs.
Advanced operating systems, such as UNIX, contain security components that can be
activated.
C DEFENSC TOOLS
The two major defense tools used in computer security are encryption and
authentication (Wood, 1983 j.
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li Encryption
Encryption is accomplished by three methods: encrypting a password table
stored in memory, using one-way encrypted passwords and using a personal key device
that contains an encrypted code after the plain text password has been entered
(Ahituv, et al., 1987). Encryption raises the effort required to break the code
(Menkus, 1988).
2. Authentication
The most widely used defense tool is use of authentication methods.
Identification by authentication is approached in two ways: use of natural properties,
such as fingerprints, or use of artificial measures, such as passwords or magnetic cards
(Ahituv, et al., 1987). Authentication methods use something known (a password),
something possessed (a personal key), something to be performed (a signature) or some
biological trait (a fingerprint) (Fisher, 1984).
The underlying logic of authentication devices takes two forms: make
computers more like people by equipping them with biometric readers or make people
more like computers by equipping them with personal computerized authentication
devices (Spender. 1987). Authentication devices take the form of biometrics, directly
connected token reading devices (keyholes which accept electronic keys), user interface
tokens (pocket devices that can generate one-time passwords) and fixed password
devices (plastic cards that contain access codes read electronically)
(Spender, 1987).
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More common than authentication devices are passwords, a group of
characters that identify a user. With this hackground in computer security. Chapter III
explores the use of passwords as a security mechanism.
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III. PASSWORDS AS A SECURITY MECHANISM
A. DEFINITION
The risk of granting access to an invalid user must be measured against the cost
of designing, implementing and maintaining an adequate security system.
Martin (1973) states that two types of errors may be possible: a false rejection in
which the person is actually a valid user and a false acceptance in which access is
granted to an imposter.
Passwords consist of a sequence of letters, numbers, special symbols or control
characters used to authenticate a user's identity (Wood, 1983).
B. WHY USE PASSWORDS?
The use of passwords is the second oldest method of access control. In the early
years of computer usage, the number of personnel authorized access was small. Each
valid user was normally known to other users, and as such, an intruder could be easily
identified. Prior to the development of networks and remote terminal capabilities,
computer hardware was centrally located. Operators were the only users authorized
access and they would have to be physically present in the computer room to
communicate with the hardware. Password protection consisted of system passwords
known to the group of operators.
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The advent of networks and end-user computing brought computer resources out
from under the centrally protected facility. A rudimentary password architecture became
the answer to the problem of protecting dispersed resources.
Passwords offer the benefits of being relatively inexpensive, readily implementable
and supported by most operating systems (Spender, 1987). A fourth benefit of
adopting a password security system is familiarity. Passwords are a known
methodology. They are viewed as a simple, friendly method to control access.
Emphasis placed on ease of use may, unfortunately, hamper the degree of security
provided.
C. TRADEOFF: EASE OF USE VERSUS SECURITY
Ease of use is defined as user-friendliness and flexibility (Wood, 1983). Some
users have developed an attitude that it is their right to use computer resources as they
desire, commonly known as the hacker ethic. Concurrent with this attitude is a desire
by users to avoid any restrictions on their ability to gain access at any time and
anywhere. The current proliferation of local area networks has greatly enhanced this
desire to gain access at the office, at home or on the road. The widespread availability
of personal computers connected to central databases has resulted in organizations
granting access to more users. Paans and Herschberg (1987) note that there is a lack
of enthusiasm among the lower ranks for security as they feel controls tend to degrade
their happiness. If password and <:i{Tn-on prorednre<: becomes difficult, users will find
ways to circumvent it, thereby degradmg security (Martin, 1973).
17
The ease of use versus security tradeoff is directly applicable to passwords.
Passwords must strike a balance between ease of remembrance by a user and difficulty
of guessing by outsiders. The longer the password, the more difficult it is to guess
(Wood, 1983). Unfortunately, most users require aids to help their recall
(Menkus, 1988). If a password is so long that a user must write it down, security has
been degraded. If a user puts a password on paper, it changes from something known
to something possessed. Knowledge of the hiding place of the paper with the password
written on it becomes the password (Porter, 1982). Figure 3-1 illustrates the tradeoff
between ease of use and security.
i i
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TRADEOFF: EASE OF USE VERSUS SECURITY
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D. OBJECTIVES OF PASSWORDS
The objective of a password is to authenticate a user of computer resources
(Wood, 1983). As the system authenticator, passwords are the first line of defense
against unauthorized use of computer systems (Wood, 1983).
Protection of personal privacy, proprietary interests, administrative confidentiality
(Barton, et al., 1984) and, in the military, national security might be achieved through
passwords. TTie privacy of personal information such as social security numbers is a
concern in large databases. The development of proprietary interests such as processes
stored in computers must be protected from industrial espionage. Confidential records
such as payroll records must be protected from intruders trying to change pay rates or
create phantom employee records for embezzlement. Unauthorized access into military
databases could result in being unprepared for an attack.
In achieving a level of protection from intruders, passwords can prevent, detect
and deter (Wood, 1983). Passwords are the second layer of a computer security
system. A determined intruder may not be deterred by a single layer of protection.
Multilayered systems can make the time and effort necessary to break into the system
so expensive thai intruders will feel it is not cost effective. Passwords are used in an
attempt to raise the cost of penetrating a system to a level where an intruder is either
prevented or deterred (Wood. 1983). Menkus (1988) recommends optimizing password
performance by making compromise as difficult and time consuming as possible.
Mdnitoring program^ can be aclrlcfi tn pa<=sword system*: that track attempted accesses
and alert system personnel.
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E. TYPES OF PASSWORDS
Passwords are categorized by two methods: generation and use. Generation
methods include system, user and manufacturer. Use methods include primary,
secondary and dynamic.
1. System Generated Passwords
The system generation of passwords is managed by a system security
administrator (Menkus, 1988). The administrator's responsibilities include selection of
new passwords, distribution of passwords, monitoring to ensure proper use of passwords
and disposition of expired passwords. System generated passwords are normally
generated either through a random number generator or a nonsense string generator
(Menkus, 1988).
The advantage of system generated passwords is that the user is removed
from the selection process. User generated passwords are normally connected with the
user's lifestyle and therefore are vulnerable to guessing by outsiders (Menkus, 1988).
System generated passwords will normally contain random characters and are not
related to a user's lifestyle.
Disadvantages of system generated passwords include difficulty in
remembering, possible repetition of generation cycles, vulnerability of storage tables and
the removal of the user from the selection process. Nonsensical strings of characters
make guessing difficult, but also make remembrance by a user difficult. Complicated
pa^<^wor(i^ tend to he forgotten or written down (Ahitiiv. et n1 . 1987).
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To combat this problem, some systems generate character strings that include
vowels, making the strings more pronounceable and therefore memorable. The tradeoff
in making system generated passwords pronounceable is that the passwords are more
vulnerable (Kurzban, 1983).
2. User Generated Passwords
User selected passwords tend to be simple and comp>osed of birthday dates,
spouse's names, nicknames and other data connected with a user's lifestyle
(Menkus, 1988). In many cases, passwords can be found in personnel files. The
Department of Defense forms teams of computer experts to test the integrity of security
systems. These tiger teams routinely comb personnel files, for passwords based on
personal data, with great success (Wood. 1983).
User selected passwords have the advantage of being simple and meaningful.
The disadvantage is that they are frequently based on trivial association and can be
guessed by outsiders (Ahituv. et al., 1987).
3. Manufacturer (Jenerated Passwords
Manufacturers typically embed or hard-code passwords into programs. These
embedded passwords ser\e as example passwords and are published in system
documentation (Wood, 1983). Example passwords are intended to be temporary until
the user selects a replacement. If the user does not remove the example password, it
may become a source of \ailnerability.
Another tv'pe of manufacturer'*; password is that used by field representatives
and technicians. These passwords typically take the form of "test" and "system"
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(Barton, et. al., 1984). They serve as a quick method by which technicians can gain
access for maintenance and repairs. Knowledge of these passwords may allow
unauthorized users to penetrate a security system.
4. Classincation by t'se
Passwords are also classified by their use: primary, secondary and dynamic.
Primary passwords are used to gain access to an initial set of resources
(Menkus, 1988). Secondary passwords are used as supplements to gain access to a
subset of resources (Menkus, 1988). E>ynamic use of passwords involves use of a
different password at each log-in (Avame, 1988).
F. EXTENDED PASSWORDS (PASSPHRASES)
Passwords, either system or user generated, share the problem of memorability.
If users construct the password, it is easy to remember but unsecure (Wood, 1983).
System generated passwords are secure but unpopular with users (Wood, 1983). The
longer the password, the more secure it is (Menkus, 1988). However, the longer the
password, the more complicated; users tend to forget long passwords or they write
them down (Ahituv, et al., 1987).
In order to take advantage of the best of both the system and user generation
methods, extended passwords or passphrases were developed as a compromise
(Wood, 1983). Passphrases are long passwords normally consisting of thirty to eighty
characters (Porter. 1^82 V Mpnkii<; C10K8) de<;cnbes an extended password as an easily
remembered but nonsensical three or four word phrase. Passphrases offer the advantage
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of allowing a user to select a password for himself. A passphrase is more likely to
be meaningful and therefore easier for a user to remember (Porter, 1982). An
additional advantage of extended passwords is the added length of the password.
Passwords should be long enough that they will yield at least one million pyossible
combinations (Fisher, 1984). Using a minimum of 30 alphabetic characters, over one
trillion combinations are possible. This foils at least one way used to determine
someone's password: trying all possible character combinations (Pfleeger, 1989). The
sheer magnitude of the effort and time required by an intruder to perform an exhaustive
search poses a high level of deterrence.
Additional schemes may be employed in conjunction with passphrases. A thirty
to eighty character passphrase can be put through a hashing algorithm. Hashing
extracts a number of designated characters from an extended password. Extracted
characters constitute an actual password that is stored in an access table. Hashing a
passphrase reduces the amount of required memory storage and provides one-way
encr>'ption (Porter, 1982).
G. CONSTRUCTION OF PASSWORDS
The success of passwords as a security mechanism is related directly to good




The longer the password, the more difficult it is to guess it and therefore
the more secure it is (Wood, 1983). Passwords are commonly constructed of six to
eight characters. This length is popular for two reasons: first, six to eight characters
are sufficient to guard against a "brute-force" attack (Wood, 1983) and second, memory
aids are commonly required for recall of passwords of more than eight characters
(Menkus, 1988). The elimination of memory aids decreases the probability that
passwords wUl be committed to paper.
The minimum length of a password determines the lower bound of security
(Menkus, 1988). Fisher (1983) suggests that the minimum length should be a set of
characters that would yield at least one rrullion possible combinations. TTie following
sets meet this minimum constraint: six decimal digits, e.g., 195863; five hexadecimal
characters, e.g., 1D6FC; five alphabetic characters, e.g., AZHWO or four alphanumeric
characters, e.g., HW39 (Fisher, 1984). A consideration in selecting a minimum length
is that intruders wiU be attracted to trying all possible combinations; i.e., an exhaustive
or brute-force attack. In an exhaustive attack, an intruder will have to try no more
thaii forty per cent of the possibilities to break a password (Menkus, 1988). A
password composed of three numeric characters yields one thousand possibilities. A
computer programmed to try each of the possible combinations will likely break the
password in little time. Doubling the length will increase the effort required by orders
of magnitude (Menkn<;. IQRK). If three numeric? were increased to si^ numerics, the
combinations increase from one thousand to one million.
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The design of the length of passwords should also consider whether a system
will allow a user to constnict a password that is shorter than the maximum. For
example, if a password is designed to be eight numeric characters, will a system allow
a user to use only four characters? Most systems will enter trailing blanks in the
unfilled spaces (Menkus, 1988). A common ploy is for the potential penetrator to
concentrate on trailing blanks first (Menkus, 1988). The elimination of the blanks will
significantly reduced the total combinations that the intruder must attempt. By
eliminating four trailing blanks, an intruder reduces the work factor from one hundred
million to ten thousand possibilities.
2. Character Set
The set of characters coupled with the number of characters determines the
effectiveness of passwords. The ideal password is composed of random characters,
such as "k&)8[" (Barton, et al., 1984). While random characters are more secure, they
are seldom pronounceable. When a password is pronounceable, users wUl be better
able to remember it (Kurzban, 1983). The addition of vowels increases
pronounceabilit>-. However, the resulting password will be more vulnerable to attack
(Kurzban, 1983;. Foi example, if vowels are inserted into the string CTWLK, it
becomes CATW'ALK.
3. Memorabilil\
The ability to remember and recall passwords is of paramount importance
ill their consTnictinn Mo^t iiser^s require memor\' aid<? to help recall (Menkus. 1988).
If a memor>' aid means writing the password on paper, a basic tenet of password
security has been violated. A password committed to paper has changed from
something known to something possessed (Porter, 1984). An intruder's work switches
from guessing to searching.
An appeal to long term memory has been divided into two classifications
of memory: semantic and episodic. These two classes form the basis for three
approaches to enhancing the memorability of passwords: semantic, episodic and
environmental (Barton, et al., 1984).
a. Semantic
Semantic memory uses information closely related to language use.
Passwords using this approach are derived from well-known character strings, such as
nursery rhymes. Nursery rhymes and similar strings are easily recalled, thereby
eliminating the need for memory aids. For example, "Jack and Jill went up the hill"
is a well known line from a childhood poem. In addition, these character strings are
not related to a user's lifestyle. Once identified, the string can be used with a hashing
routine or a transform procedure to produce a phoneme, word or phrase that is actually
the password.
b. Episodic
Episodic memors' relies directly on individual, personal experience. To
a large degree, this experience will be unshared. Provided the user avoids the obvious
references to experience, such as birthday dates and children's names, this type of
memop,- i^ recommended for pa<;<;\\'nrd <:y<;tems. Transform procedures can operate in
conjunction with episodic memory to produce passwords.
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f. Environmental
Environmental clues trigger the recall of passwords. A picture on the
office wall or a room number can serve as the basis of a character string. If the user's
terminal is located in a room that is painted green, "green walls" could serve as the
initial character string. If a user's office is in room 821 at 1275 Sams Street, 8211275
could serve as the environmental trigger for a password. This string could then be
manipulated by a transform procedure to produce the actual password. In the above
example of 8211275, a transform procedure could take the even digits of 822 and add
that result back to the initial room number to come up with the final password; i.e.,
822 plus 821 equals 1643. In this example, 1643 is the password triggered by the
environmental clue of the room number 821.
4. Transform Procedures
Character strings produced by any of the three methods above can be
coupled with transfomT procedures. A transfomi procedure manipulates a string to
produce a user- recognizable and memorable password (Barton, et al., 1984). Effective
transform procedures are evaluated on the following criteria: ability to achieve a high
degree of congeniality; i.e., easy to remember and to execute; ability to produce
structured passwords that can be recreated which helps error discovery and ability to
produce passwords resistant to guessing and systematic trials. Common transform
technique*; are excerption and substitution
. In excerption, a designated number of
characters are excerpted based on their position within a string. The excerpted
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characters form the actual password. Substitution can also be used. Common
substitution practices inclnde the substitution of preceding or succeeding characters.
The resulting string of substituted characters constitutes the password.
(Barton, et al., 1984)
5. Mnemonics
Closely related to transform procedures are mnemonics. The phonetic
sounding of a character string may yield an expression that is pronounceable and
memorable (Barton, et al., 1984). For example, the character string FRGTFL could be
phonetically sounded as FOR-GET-FUL. While FRGTFL is the password, the phrase
FOR-GET-FUL is the mnemonic that causes the password to be memorable. Other
ways of avoiding memor>' aids are: inverting the order of characters, converting
alphabetic characters to their numeric equivalents, shifting characters one or two
positions and creating acronyms from initial letters of a meaningful phrase
(Menkus, 1988).
6. Summary
Good formulation produces passwords that are distanced enough in form
from ordmar)' experience to make compromise unlikely (Barton, et al., 1984). Whether
produced by semantic, episodic or environmental methodologies, passwords should be
evaluated for effectiveness. Ahituv, Lapid and Neumann (1987) propose the following
evaluation criteria:
1. should be easily memorized.
2. should be hard to guess through association.
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?>. should he CRsy to enter into the computer.
4. should not be able to be used if expired,
5. should be resistant to attack by spoofing or trojan horses,
6. should be tested,
7. should not take a long time to implement and
8. should not be cost prohibitive.
H. PROBLEMS WITH PASSWORDS
The use of passwords as a security mechanism is a much debated topic.
Opinions on effectiveness range from criticism as offering little resistance to a serious
attack (Avame, 1988) and their use is rarely well managed (Menkus, 1988) to praise
as the most cost-effective approach to human user authentication (Wood, 1983).
Menkus (1988) makes the comparison of a password to a conventional lock; it keeps
out only honest people.
Traditional passwords have three weaknesses: they can often be guessed, they are
entered in the clear where they can be observed and they are used more than once
(Avame, 1988). These weaknesses are further supplemented by Ahituv, Lapid and
Neumann (1987): passwords are normally stored in tables in an operating system which
itself is subject to compromise and spoof routines. Spoof routines, explained below, can
be used during a log-in procedure to capture passwords from an unsuspecting user.
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Eight methods of finding out a password have been identified: guessing, reading,
hash tables, eavesdropping, intercept, signal radiation, spoofing and terminal buffers
(Avame, 1988).
1. Guessing
Users commonly use names, telephone numbers and other trivial but
memorable data as passwords. Guessing entails repeated trials based on a certain
amount of knowledge. To prevent guessing, systems may be equipp>ed with counter
programs that allow only a certain number of unsuccessful attempts before freezing out
a would-be user. Such systems can still be penetrated through the intruder attempting
one less than the maximum allowable attempts each day until successful.
2. Reading
Passwords committed to paper are usually looked up just before a log-in.
People nearby may see the location of a written password. Systems requiring frequent
changes of passwords may increase the likelihood of users writing them down. In
addition, frequent changes in passwords may be circumvented by re-entering an
identical password or altemating between two passwords.
3. Hash Tables
Hash tables may lead to a false sense of security. An intruder needs only
to know a hashed result of a password. Any character string that yields the same
hashed result will suffice.
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4. Eavesdropping
Most computer terminals do not echo a password back to the screen.
Nonetheless, a person nearby may observe a sequence of keystrokes. Even listening
to the number of keystrokes yields the length of a password.
5. Intercept
The proliferation of networks is a rich area for exploitation. Tapping into
a line between a terminal and a host can give direct access to an intruder.
6. Signal Radiation
All electronic equipment, unless Tempest certified, emit radiomagnetic
signals. These signals can be monitored and intercepted. Each keystroke emits a
unique signal that can be correlated to give a direct interception of transmissions.
7. Spoofing
Penetrators develop programs that emulate terminal log-in procedures. A
valid user enters a password not knowing that a spoof program is receiving the data
instead of the computer. At the end of a log-in procedure, the computer gives an error
message. The user assumes that a error has been made in keying in the information
and re-enters the password. On the second try, the log-in is successful. Unbeknownst




Passwords are written into a buffer from which the security prograin can
read the entry. If a buffer is of large size or if system usage is low, a password may
stay resident in a buffer for an indefinite time. An intruder monitoring a buffer may
be able to read its passwords that are still resident.
I. MYTHS ABOUT PASSWORDS
Closely related to the problems associated with passwords are the unrealistic
expectations of security provided by passwords. Of a list of twelve misconceptions
about information processing security, four are relevant to passwords (Kurzban, 1983).
1. Pronounceability
Myth: If system generated passwords are pronounceable, users will remember
them. The addition of vowels to nonsense strings may result in pronounceability, but
they also make the password more vulnerable. Meaning acts as a natural memory aid.
Kurzban recommends choosing passwords that are hard to guess, not hard to remember.
2. Incorrect Passwords
Myth: An incorrect password indicates an attempt to gain unauthorized
access. Most incorrect passwords are from authorized users who have either forgotten
or miskeyed. The owner has lost the password and tries to guess it through trial and
error (Panns, et al., 1987).
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3. Revoking Rights
Myth: Successive incorrect passwords indicate an unauthorized user and the
rights of the password owner should be revoked. As in Myth 2, most incorrect
passwords resuh from legitimate users. An intruder can sabotage a system by entering
successive passwords that result in the valid user being frozen out of the system.
Without actually breaking into the computer system, the potential intruder has
significantly affected both the users and the system.
4. Layered Passwords
Myth: A different password for each resource layer enhances security.
While a certain benefit may be gained from layered passwords, users resent multiple
passwords and may seek revenge on the system.
J. ADMINISTRATION OF PASSWORDS
Password systems require maintenance. Akin to logical fences, passwords systems
require periodic maintenance (Wood, 1983). In large systems, security may be in the
hands of a full-time security manager. In smaller systems, security is likely to be part
of a system administrator's job.
A security manager is responsible for maintaining and modifying a computer
system's security. As well as duties related to passwords, a manager is responsible for
physical security and disaster recover}'. Monitoring a system for evidence of tamf>ering
an^l proper pa<:<=\^'orH use are a <:eciirifv manager's primar\' duties.
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User education in security matters is also a concern of a security manager
(Wood, 1983). Users have certain responsibilities when using the system and should
be duly aware of the consequences of inappropriate actions (Panns, et al., 1987).
Education will make users aware of how a password system can protect their
information from unauthorized access. At the same time, educated users will be aware
of how the design and protection of passwords can enhance overall system security.
Help with developing passwords should be available on-line. Technical information
about length, type of characters and ranges should be accessible to users
(Barton, et al., 1984).
K. PASSWORD SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
Wood (1983) asserts that a password security system is successful if it meets the
following criteria:
1. Passwords are not visible when typed.
2. An alarni is generated if successive log-in attempts exceed a specified threshold.
3. A password storage table is encrypted and is not reversible.
4. Passwords travelling over networks are encrypted.
5. Provision is made for a special password to indicate a user is under duress and
is being forced to log-in.
6. Error messages are limited to a single message that does not indicate which step
in the log-in process was wrong.
7. A pa<;<;v^'f^rH romine i<; <:pprprntf"ri from the resource thnt it protects.
8. Re -verification of a password is required if a session exceeds a specified time
limit.
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9. Automatic log-off occurs if no activity takes place after a prescribed time
period.
Successful implementation of system-generated passwords should include
provisions for the secure distribution of passwords. Two common distribution methods
are (1) conventional mail using double envelopes or specially designed envelopes that
mask a password and (2) network transmission using encryption (Menkus, 1988). A
user-selected password system eliminates the need for a password distribution system
(Spender, 1987).
A password securit>' system requires the commitment of top management.
Information is a strategic resource. Lost or damaged information may have costly
implications for an organization. Historically, hardware was the major cost of a
computer system. In recent information systems, software is the major expense.
Management often uses hardware values instead of the value of the information to base
their security decisions (Wood, 1983).
Menkus (1988; identifies five ways to improve performance of a password
security system:
1. insist that an organization's policies are enforced,
2. prohibit storing of passwords in tables to speed network connectivity,
3. penalize deliberate disclosure of passwords no matter how good an excuse,
4. require frequent password-changing and
5. insist that pa«;sword«; be actually changed.
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L. PROTECTION OF PASSWORDS
Successfully breaking a password may allow an unauthorized user total access to
a computer system. In many systems, passwords are not only the first line of defense
(Wood, 1983) they are the only line of defense. With the importance placed on
passwords, security of passwords is a major concern. Passwords may be compromised
by:
1. trying all possibilities;
2. trying all probable passwords;
3. trying passwords likely for a user;
4. searching for a system list of passwords;
5. asking a user. (Pfleeger, 1989)
Additional protection may be had through the use of encryption. Techniques
include encryption of password tables stored in memory, use of one-time encrypted
passwords and use of personal keys that are inserted after a plain text password is
entered (Ahituv, et al., 1987). One-way encryption increases the work needed to enter
a system (Menkus, 1988). Encryption of password tables may be accomplished by the
simple addition or subtraction of some constant (Menkus, 1988). Whichever encryption
method is used, care should be given to ensure that an encryption process does not
expose encryption techniques used for other resources (Ahituv, et al., 1987).
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M. SUMMARY
Passwords can be an inexpensive, effective means to system security. The
tradeoff between memorability (ease of use) and security will affect a user's
environment. If a user's environment is imfriendly, a user wUl find ways of
overcoming the difficulty and in turn, may compromise system security (Martin, 1973).
A hostile environment is caused by an emphasis on security at the expense of password
memorability (Barton, et al., 1984).
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IV. NEW APPROACHES TO PASSWORDS
A. IS THERE A BETTER WAY?
Traditional passwords have advantages and disadvantages. Inexpensive, readily
implemented and supported by most operating systems (Spender, 1987) are the
advantages of passwords. The need for memory aids and potentially hostile
environments are among their disadvantages. Opinions about the effectiveness of
passwords range from seeing them as useless against attack (Avame, 1988) to calling
them the most cost-effective approach to human user authentication (Wood, 1983).
Balanced between these views are the issues of memorability and security
(Barton, et al., 1984). Smith (1987) recommends that systems be made easier to use
and harder to misuse. The cmx of the problem is to develop a fast, reliable
identification process that will not hinder users or effective computer use (Smith, 1987).
The perceived inability of traditional passwords to support adequate levels of
security plus demands from users for a friendly environment have lead to several new
approaches. Identity-authentication can be accomplished in four ways:
1. sometliing possessed (Porter, 1982),
2. something characteristic of a user (Porter, 1982),
3. something knovn (^Porter. 1Q82),
4. something the user can do (Spender, 1987).
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1. Something Possessed
Identification of users by possession of a physical object has gained
popularity. The advent of banking system automatic teller machine systems has led
millions of people to become familiar with physical tokens, such as bank authentication
cards. Most automatic teller systems are coupled with a secondary identification
process: a personal identification number must be keyed into the system to gain access.
Authentication by something possessed coupled with something known (Wood, 1983)
has been very successful. Identification by possession is not secure. Tokens can be
lost, stolen or copied (Smith, 1987).
2. Something Characteristic of a User
Biometric authentication using natural properties of a user, such as
fingerprints, is an emerging technology (Ahituv, et al., 1987). A drawback of
biometrics is the requirement of special equipment to recognize and transmit the
property
. Two methods of breaking the biometric system are (1) faking the pattern that
corresponds to the digital representation of the trait or occurrence and (2) modifying
the table that stores the trait representations (Ahituv, et al., 1987).
3. Something Known
Passwords, something known, even with the previously described faults, are
an economical, viable security mechanism. A common reaction to password problems
is the imposition of constraints. While well intentioned, many of these constraints have
only exacerbated the problem. Ineffective efforts to make password*; more secure will
also make authentication more difficult (Smith, 1987). The U.S. Department of
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Defense recommends that user-generated passwords be replaced by system-generated
passwords (CSC-STD-002-85, 1985). Complicated passwords tend to be forgotten and
are written down (Ahituv, et al., 1987).
4. Something a User Can Do
Closely related to the category of something characteristic of a user is
identification based on something the user can do, such as write a signature
(Spender, 1987). Identification based on the user's ability to perform a specific action
has advantages and disadvantages similar to authentication based on a user's
characteristics: both require special equipment in order to read and interpret the
occurrence. Both systems may be defeated by either knowing the interpreted results
of the mechanism or gain access to the table containing the occurrence representations
(Ahituv, et al., 1987).
B. NEW APPROACHES
Smith (1987) suggests three new and creative approaches to password
authentication systems: a biographical model, a personal interests model and a word
association model.
1. Biographical Model
This model is based on biographical data that would normally not be
available to an intruder. For example, a user's mother's maiden name or the first name
of a liter's first girlfriend or ho\'frien(l could be used to develop a password.
Screening of data would ensure that the biographical data could not be found in
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personnel records. In the above examples, both answers are seldom in personnel
records and are usually known only by the specific user. Smith postulates one
problem: users might resent being asked to divulge such information.
2. Personal Interest Model
The personal interest model is based on a dialogue between a user and a
computer by which a computer can assess the validity of an identity claim. A user's
habits or opinions can form the basis for development of a password. For example,
a user's favorite color or a user's favorite dessert may serve as the basis of a
password. Advantages of these two examples are that both answers are not normally
found in personnel records and are usually known only by the user. Drawbacks of the
personal interest model are the length of a dialogue session and user resistance to the
questions.
3. Word Association Model
Smith (1987) proposes a system identification test based on the following
criteria:
1. quick identification of users through individualistic responses;
2. entails httle recaD burden, i.e., information should have a high degree of
congeniality;
3. the process should be designed to minimize user resentment.
Using these criteria, Smith proposed a password system based on word
association. Examples of such as<:ociations might be the cue "officer" followed by the
response of "Navy". Four advantages were postulated:
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1. reliable identification through uniqueness to an individual,
2. robustness and resistance to intrusion,
3. high memorability and
4. little user resistance by allowing a user to select paired words. (Smith, 1987)
Smith designed his word association model using two criteria: structure and
memorability.
a. Structure
The system would be implemented by having a user enter a list of
twenty words as cues. Cues and responses are user selected. Single words were
selected to ensure higher recall and ease of entry. At an initial session, a user enters
the paired responses. At a subsequent session, a user is prompted by a randomly
selected cue. In return, an associated response is entered. If a cue and a response
match, access is granted. As long as stereotype associations such as "blue-sky" are
avoided, each cue and response is unique to the user and therefore harder to break.
b. Memorability
A primary concern was the ability of a user to recall responses over
an extended time. A group of users were selected as the test population. In a test six
months after the initial administration, users were asked to recall cues and responses.
Recall averaged twenty-four per cent for cues and ninety four per cent for responses.
Eighteen months after the initial administration, the members were again tested. Recall
averaged twenty nine per cent for cues and eighty six per cent for responses.
Unfortunately a sample of only four users was used in this test. Nonetheless, the point
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is that cues can serve as memory aids. Users need memory aids to recall passwords
(Menkus, 1988). User selected passwords are easier to remember (Wood, 1983).
Being user-selected, responses reflect personal associations. Personal association is
based on episodic memory which is preferred for password formulation
(Barton, et al., 1984).
c. Vulnerability to Attack
Attack by trying all possible combinations is defeated by the sheer
magnitude of the required effort. In order to successfully break a word association, an
intruder must know both a cue and its paired response. A cue and response could be
structured to consist of a minimum of three alphabetic characters and a maximum of
eight alphabetic characters. This structure yields a minimum of three million possible
passwords and a maximum of two billion. Without contextual knowledge of word
pairs, intruders would have little chance of breaking such a system (Smith, 1987).
Paired cues and responses are stored in tables in memory. The table is encrypted to
reduce its chance of compromise. However, a word association model suffers the same
problems as other password systems: interception, eavesdropping and monitoring
(Smith, 1987;.
d. Conclusions
Smith (1987) found the word association model to be robust and offered
the following advantages:
1. users do not need to remember cues,
2. users do not need a printed cue list as a memory aid.
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3. user*; do not need to display their entire paired cue response list unless
conducting periodic changes and
4. users do not need the response echoed to the terminal screen.
e. Summary
The Smith Word Association Model highlights how traditional password
systems can be improved to make them more robust and less vulnerable to attack. One
of the most common complaints concerning passwords is that they offer little resistance
to a serious attack (Avame, 1988). The magnitude of the time and effort required to
break this system is so great that it acts as an effective deterrent to even the most
serious attacker. Figure 4-1 evaluates the word association model based on
Ahituv, Lapid and Neumann's (1984) criteria described in Chapter HI.
44
EVALUAT ON OF TUC
WORD ASSOC AT ON MODEL 1
CRITERIA MODEL
1 EASILY REMEMBERED '^ YES
2. HARD TO GUESS BY ASSOCIATION '? YES
3 EASY TO KEY- IN '? YES
A ATTACKABLE BY SPOOFING
OR TROJAN HORSE ^ YES
5 TESTED -^ YES
6 EASr TO IMPLEMENT
"
YES
7 COST PROHIBITIVE '^ NO
FIGURE 4-1
4. Cognitive Password Model
An outgrowth of Smith's (1987) three models is a cognitive password model,
the maui subject of this paper. A cognitive password system uses passwords based on
perception, intuition, personal interests and personal histor>'; i.e., Smith's (1987)
biographical and personal interest models.
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a. Advantages of Cognitive Passwords
A biographical model offers the advantage of information not normally
found in personnel records (Smith, 1987). This information is known only to the user,
thereby making guessing difficult. A personal interest model affords the advantage of
easy recall without a need for memory aids (Smith, 1987). Since the information is
significant to the user, he or she is able to remember without a memory aid, thereby
eliminating the possibility of a password being changed from something known to
something possessed.
Since both biographical and personal interest models are used, the
advantages of each model accrue to a cognitive system. A cognitive password system
is based on information not normally found in personnel records, on f)ersonal
information and on information that is easUy recalled.
b. Ease of Use versus Security Tradeoff
The tradeoff between ease of use and security is a major concern of
security managers (Wood, 1983). The easier a password is to use or remember, the
less security it offers, normally through requiring a memory aid (Wood, 1983).
Similarly, the more security a password offers, the harder it is to use or remember
(Ahituv, et al., 1987). Figure 3-1 in Chapter III illustrates this tradeoff. A cognitive
password system resolves this dilemma to a greater degree than does traditional
passwords. A cognitive password is composed of significant events, biographical data,
personal habits or personal intere^^Ts A«; the selected information is significant and
personal to the user, he or she is able to recall the information without the need for
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a memory aid, thereby satisfying the ease of use requirement. The degree of security
provided by a password is based on two criteria: need for memory aids and ability to
be guessed. The elimination of the need for a memory aid has already been discussed.
Guessing is a primary method of password compromise (Avame, 1988). Guessing can
be accomplished through trivial association, such as a spouse's name and birthday dates
(Ahituv, et al., 1987). A cognitive password system defeats guessing since cognitive
passwords are based on information not easily associated with the user.
c. User-related versus System-generated
Traditional passwords are developed in two ways: user-selected or
system-generated. User-selected passwords tend to be simple (Menkus, 1988) and are
based on trivial association, such as a spouse's name (Ahituv, et al., 1987). While
easily recalled, user-selected passwords are easily guessed and therefore afford a low
degree of securit>' (Ahituv, et al., 1987). System-generated passwords are strings of
nonsensical characters (Menkus, 1988). A nonsensical string makes guessing harder,
but it makes remembrance more difficult, thereby requiring memory aids
(Ahituv, et al., 1987). Cognitive passwords combine the advantages of both types of
traditional passwords. A user selects a cognitive password based on personal, non-
trivial information. Since the password is based on significant information, recall is
high without the need for memory aids. At the same time, since a selected password
is not easily guessed, it provides a higher degree of security than traditional passwords.
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d. Construction
Success of password systems is directly related to good construction.
Cognitive passwords satisfies the three elements of good construction: length, character
set and memorability.
(1) Length. The minimum number of characters comprising a
password sets the lower security bound (Menkus, 1988). A threshold of 1,000,000
possible combinations is adequate for most systems (Fisher, 1983). A common length
is six to eight characters (Wood, 1983). This length is sufficient to deter "brute-force"
attacks (Wood, 1983) and memory aids are not normally required (Menkus, 1988). The
implemented cognitive password model is comprised of twenty passwords of a
maximum of twenty characters each. While not all twenty sets of passwords questions
and answers are required to gain access, an intruder must know all twenty answers in
order to ensure entry. A minimum length is not specified, but a minimum of five to
six characters per answer is anticipated. Assuming a minimum average of five
alphabetic characters, each set has over 11,000,000 possible combinations. The
cognitive authentication process allows a maximum of ten questions per session for a
total of 110,000,000 possible combinations. Any "brute-force" attack wUl require
considerable time and effort, thereby either preventing or deterring an attacker
(Wood, 1983).
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(2) Character Set. Pronounceability, the addition of vowels to
characters, is a major issue in password construction. Random characters yield the
highest degree of security (Barton, et al., 1984), but they are neither pronounceable, nor
memorable (Kurzban, 1983). If passwords are pronounceable, they are more vulnerable
to attack (Kurzban, 1983). Cognitive passwords offer the advantage of pronounceability
plus they are less vulnerable to attack. A user selects meaningful answers to cognitive
password questions. These answers are pronounceable, but since they are not readily
associated with the user, the answers are less vulnerable to attack.
(3) Memorability. The degree of memorability determines the need
for memory aids. Elimination of the need for memory aids protect passwords from
being changed from something known to something possessed (Porter, 1984). Of the
two types of long term memor>', semantic and episodic, episodic memory is
recommended for password use (Barton, et al., 1984). Episodic memory is based on
individual and unshared personal experience (Barton, 1984). Cognitive passwords offer
the advantages of not requiring memor>' aids and being based on episodic memor>'.
€. Summary
A cognitive password security system surpasses traditional password
systems in the areas of ease of use versus security, user-selected versus system-
generated and construction. Chapters V and VI cover research into the memorability





A basic premise of the cognitive password system is that the users provide the
data upon which the cognitive password challenges are based. This data consists of
three types: fact-based, interest-based and opinion-based that is normally known only
to the user. A fact-based challenge asks something that a user knows but is a fact
independent of a user's regard, e.g., "What is the name of the elementary school that
you last attended?" An interest-based item might ask "What is your favorite tyf>e of
music?" An example of an opinion-based question would be "What is you favorite
flower?"
Of crucial interest in this research is the memorability of cognitive passwords and
their susceptibility to guessing by people closely associated with the users. A
simultaneous test of the recall of system-generated passwords (random alphanumeric
seven-character strings) and user-created passwords is conducted. If cognitive
passwords can be shown to possess both a high degree of memorability and low degree
of vulnerability to guessing, the cognitive password system can be shown to be based
on a robust foundation that yields high ease of use and a high degree of security.
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B. METHODOLOGY
The following is a description of the methodology used in gathering data for this
paper.
1. Instrumentation
To assess the ease of recall for cognitive passwords, three forms of similar
self-administered questionnaires were developed. A copy of each questionnaire form
is included in the appendix. Each user-respondent answered the first and third forms
of the questionnaire, Ql and Q2. They were answered by the primary respondents in
the study which were designated variously as the user-respondents or the Ql
respondents. A significant -other (spouse, close friend or sibling) for each user-
respondent completed the second form. This questionnaire was designated the Q2
form.
a. Demographic Items
Both the Ql and Q3 forms asked for three categories of responses.
The fust pan of Ql asked for the respondent's age, sex, years of computer usage,
types of computer with which they were experienced (mainframe terminal, stand-alone
micro or micro linked to mainframe) and the la.st four digits of the respondent's Social
Security number. The Q3 form asked only for the Social Securit}' number digits, so
that it could be matched with its Ql counterpart. The Social Security digits are used
to mask the identity of individual respondents in the data base of this study, while
allowing matching of the Ql. 02 and O^ fonn*; during the course of the research.
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b. Creation and Assignment of Passwords
The second part of Ql, but not Q3, asked each respondent to create a
password consisting of any combination of up to eight alphanumeric characters. The
test group was urged to memorize and safeguard this password as they would any other
password. They were then asked how they devised this password. Four choices were
given: (1) does the password represent a meaningful detail such as a name, a date or
a number; (2) does the password represent a combination of meaningful details;
(3) does the password represent a random choice of characters or (4) other. The
second part of Ql displayed a unique seven-character password that was assigned to
each respondent. The password was constructed of a random combination of letters
and numbers. The respondents were urged to memorize and safeguard this password
as well.
c. Cognitive Data Items
The Ql and Q3 forms are identical in their third section. In this part,
20 open response items ask for items of information that were described as cognitive
data. These data fall into two categories of responses. In the first group, six items
ask for personal facts that were assumed that only a respondent or someone socially
close to a respondent would know. For example: elementary school attended, first
name of favorite uncle, first name of best friend in high school, mother's maiden name,
first name of first boyfriend/girlfriend and father's occupation. In the second group,
14 interest-based and opiTiion-hased itpin<; a<;k each respondent to declare a favorite.
For example: favorite music, favorite color, favorite flower, favorite vegetable and
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favorite dessert. Again, the assumption was made that these responses would be known
only by a respondent or by someone close to him or her.
d. Items for Recall of Cognitive Data
In the identical Q3 version of the cognitive data section, the same
respondents were asked the same questions again approximately three months from the
first administration. In examining the feasibility of a system of passwords based upon
cognitive data, the correlation of responses between the Ql and Q3 administrations is
of interest. Expectations are that there will be a high correlation between the six fact-
based cognitive items. Also of interest is to what extent the opinion-based cognitive
data "favorites" might vary with the passage of time.
€. Items for Recall of Passwords
Where Ql assigned a random password and asked for the creation of
a password, the second part of Q3 asked the same respondents, at a later time, to recall
these passwords. First after asking each person to recall the password of his or her
own making, each respondent was asked whether he recalled his password from
memor>' or had resorted to writing it down. Secondly, each respondent was asked to
recall the assigned password on the Ql fonn. The respondents were again asked
whether they recalled it from memor>' or had written it down. Expectations were that
the respondents would recall the passwords they created better than the assigned
random string of characters. Additionally, of interest was the extent to which the use
of a written memon' aid confounded that expectation.
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/. Items to Tap Socially-Close Knowledge of Cognitive Data
Tlie Q2 significant-othtr form asked for only two items of idcnlifying
data. It asked for the last four digits of the user-respondent's Social Security number
to be used for matching purposes. It then asked for the relationship of the Q2
significant-other respondent to the Ql respondent. The remainder of the Q2 form
repeated the 20 cognitive data items in the third section of the Ql form. The
significant-other respondent was asked to indicate what he or she thought the Ql
respondent would answer to each of the questions. They were asked to complete the
Q2 form without help from the Ql respondent. The Q2 respondents were also asked
to answer only those items in which they were confident of their responses while
leaving blank those where they would need to guess at the response. Of interest was
the level of accuracy at which the Q2 significant-others could match the responses of
the Ql user-respondents. The assumption was that if someone socially-close to a user
had deficient knowledge of personal cognitive data, then the likelihood of guessing by
someone socially-distant from the same user would be remote.
2. Sample and Data Collection Design
a. Ql Response by User-Respondent
The Ql questionnaire was administered to 106 graduate students
majoring in management information systems. The average age of the participants was
31.8 years in a range from 25 to 41 years. Of the respondents, 76% were male and
247c were female. Tliey a^'eraged four years of experience in usinf computers. All of
the respondents had some experience with computers; the average was 4 years and
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9.4% had been using them for less than a year. Forty five percent reported that they
used some combination of microcomputer and mainframe, 30% said their computer
experience was limited to microcomputers, while 12% claimed to use only a
mainframe.
b. Q2 Response by Significant-Other
After completing Ql forms, the user-respondents were given the Q2
form. They were asked to write the last four digits of their Social Security number
on the form and then give it to a significant-other of their choosing. They were asked
to return the Q2 forms within one week. Q2 forms were returned by 88 or 83% of
the user-respondents. Of these, seven contained missing data, yielding 81 or 76%
complete Q2 forms. Of the significant-others responding, 75% were spouses, 20% were
friends and 5% were siblings.
c. Q3 Response by User-Respondent
The Q3 version of the questionnaire was administered to the same user-
respondents approximately three months after the Ql administration. Again, the
administration was to the same test group that had completed Ql forms. Of the
original 106 Ql respondents, 99 or 93% participated in the Q3 administration.
C. TABULATION
Upon completion of the administration of the Ql, Q2 and Q3 questionnaires, the
data wa«; tabulated and analized u<;ing standard statistical methods. Chapter VI explores




1. Recall of Passwords
Table 1 reflects the ability of the user-respondents to recall both the assigned
password and the self-selected password. Of the user-respondents, 35.4% were able to
accurately recall the password which they had created themselves three months earlier.
Slightly over 23% of these user-respondents were able to recall the assigned seven-
character random string password. Fourteen people accurately recalled both their self-
generated password and the assigned password.
CONVENTIONAL PA5SV/0RD RECALL
NUMBER PERCENT
TYPE Of- WHO WHO
PA55WORD RECALLED RECALLED
Self- generated 35 35.4
ABSianea 23 23 2
TABLF 1
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The password recall results immediately provoke the question as to how the
user-respondents were able to reproduce either of the two passwords three months later.
Table 2 shows that 86% of the user-respondents reported that they recalled their self-
generated password from memory without writing it down. The remaining 14%

















The expected opposite effect is found in the case of the assigned random-
string password. When this password was assigned on the Ql form, the likely
response may have been that it was nonsensical and lacked any mnemonic character.
This may have been motive enough for the user-respondents to write it down as,
indeed, 65.89c of them did. Nonetheless, using a password of their own making and
being confident that they would nor need to write it down, only 35.49r of the
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respondents could recall it three months later. Even where the user-respondents were
sure they had to write it down, as in the case of the difficult-to-memorize assigned
password, only 23.2% could recall it by the time of the Q3 administration. Apparently,
people who could not recall their passwords also could not recall where they have
written them down.
A meaningful detail was described to the respondents on the Ql form of the
questionnaire as an item such as a name, a date or a number. Table 3 shows that a





Meaningful detail 49 "^6 7
Combination of nneanmafui
aetaiiE ' 32 30 5




2. Recall of Cognitive Data by User Respondents
The overall average number of correct matches by the user-respondents on
all cognitive data questions between Ql and Q3 was 16.3 out of 20 questions or 82%.
Figure 6-1 reflects this distribution. Of interest is the congregation of the success rate
of these user-respondents at the high end of the spectrum. While somewhat skewed,
the distribution approximates that of a normal curve. The lowest level of success was
13 correct matches (65%) of cognitive data items out of a possible 20. The modal
range is 15 to 17 correct responses (75% to 85%). Of interest is the comparison of
the level of these responses on cognitive data with the responses for the two types of
passwords recalled over the same period. The best password response was 35.2% for
the self-generated passwords. On the cognitive data continuum, the number of correct
matches for self-generated passwords would be equivalent to obtaining only seven
correct cognitive matches. No respondent scored that poorly on cognitive data.
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_i 1 I I II''
1 7 3 A 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 1? 13 14 15 16 17 18 1920
QUESTION NUMBER
FIGURE 6-1
The success of these user-respondents in recalling cognitive data items over
a three-month period is expressed in the percentage of correct matches that were
produced on the Q3 form. TTie average for the fact-based cognitive items was 94.1%
(Table 4). Only one of the responses was below 90%. Again, recall of self-generated
passwords was 32.2%.
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USER- RESPONDENT MATCHING ON
FACT- BASED COGNITIVE DATA ITEMS
ITEM
wnat IS tne name of the eiefTientary
school from which you graauated ''
Wnat IS the name of you''
favorite uncle
"
What IS the name of you^
Dest friend in high school '^
What IS your motne' s maiden name "^
wnat was the first name of your
first txiyfrieno cr girifnena '^












As expected, the success rate for recall of the interest-based and opinion-
based cognitive items is somewhat lower than that for the fact-based items.
Nonetheless, the average percentage of correct responses produced on the Q3 form was
87.9%. The matches on a third of these items was over 90%. Only one item had a
match rate below 80Tf. Tables 5. 6 and 7 portray the matching for interest and fact-
based cognitive data items.
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USER- RESPONDENT MATCHING ON INTEREST- BASED






What was the name of your
favorite class in high school ^ BO
What IS the nanne of your
favorite nnusic perfornner or group ^ 74
What IS your favorite type of nnusic ^ B6
What IS the nanne of your favorite
vacation place ^ B4
If you could travel to any country in












USER- RESPONDENT MATCHING ON INTEREST- BASED
AND OPINION- BASED COGNITIVE DATA ITEMS
ITEM
What IS the last hame of your
favorite actof or actress ^
What IS your favorite flower '^
What IS your favorite dessert ^
What IS your favorite vegetable ^
What IS you'' favorite fruit ^













USER-RESPONDENT MATCHING ON INTEREST-BASED






If you could change occupations, which
new occupation would you choose ^ 92 92.9
What IS the name of your
favorite restaurant '^ 87 B7,9
What IS the last nanne of your
favorite colleoe instructor '^ 97 98.0
TABLE 7
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3. Matching of User-Respondent Cognitive Items by
Significant-Others
The average number of correct matches by significant-others on all cognitive
data questions from the Q2 form was 5.4 out of 20, or 27%. Figure 6-2 reflects the
distribution of the correct matches. Again, the distribution approaches that of a normal
curve. The distribution curve emphasizes the success rate of the significant-others and
is skewed toward the low end of the spectrum. The highest level of success was 10
correct matches (50%) of cognitive data items out of a possible 20. The modal range
is 4 to 7 correct responses (20% to 35%). Comparing the distribution of the profile
in Figure 6-2 with that in Figure 6-1, there is no overlap. The user-respondents abDity
to recall cognitive items dwells in the range of 13 to 20 successful matches (out of 20)
while the abilit>' of the socially-close significant-others to know how the users would
respond gravitates toward the range of zero to 11
.
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QUESTION NUMBER
FKiL'RE 6-2
These significant-other respondents are assumed to be the people closest to
the user-respondents: spouses, boyfriends or girlfriends and siblings. Yet, even they
do not have correct knowledge, on average, of more than 70% of the items of personal
information and personal preferences of the user-respondents.
The difficulty the significant-others had in matching the cognitive data
answers of the user-respondents is confirmed in the average percentage score for fact-
based cognitive items: 36 Q^r TTaMe 8V The a<;sumption was made that the fact-
based items would be better known by a socially-close other than would the opinion-
based items. The data confirm this assumption as examination of the matches on
interest-based and opinion-based items reveals below. Nonetheless, even though the
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socially-close others are precisely the people who should know better than anyone else
the personal facts about the user-respondents, they knew only about a third of the
correct responses.
USER- RESPONDENT MATCHING ON INTEREST- BASED
AND OPINION- BASED COGNITIVE DATA ITEMS
ITEM
What IS the last na'^e of your
favorite actor or actress ^
wnat IS you'' favo^'ite flowe" '-^
Wnat IS your favorite dessert ^
What IS your favcite vegetable '^
wnat IS your favorite fruit '^












As expected, the significant-others know less about the personal preferences
of the u^er-respondent^ (Ta^'l'**: ^. K^ and 11) than they know aboiir the user-
respondents' p>ersonal facts. The average {percentage score of matches for the 14
opinion-based items is 22.9^c
,
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An assumption was made that the significant-other respondents are the
people in the best position to possess personal knowledge about the user-respondents.
The significant-others (spouses, siblings and boyfriends or girlfriends) were assumed,
in a social context, to have superior personal knowledge of the user-respondents. Of
interest is the ability of gauging just how much personal knowledge is held by socially-
close people. A further assumption is that the accuracy of personal knowledge would
decrease as soon as even the slightest social distance was introduced.
To examine this social -distance notion of decreasing personal knowledge, the
average number of correct matches was calculated on the overall set of 20 cognitive
items for the 62 spouses and the 16 friends. TTie average number of correct matches
for spouses was 5.8 (29%); the average for friends was 3.15 (16%). The difference
between the two is 54%. To the extent that "friends" can be assumed to be socially
more distant than spouses (however slight that might be), the assumption of social-
distance affecting personal knowledge has merit.
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SIGNIFICANT-OTHER MATCHING ON INTEREST- BASED
AND OPINION- BASED COGNITIVE DATA ITEMS
ITEM
What w£5 the name of your
favorite class in high school ^
What IS the name of your
favorite music performer or group ^
What IS you'' favorite type of music '^
What IS the name of ycu'' favorite
vacation place ^
If you cojia travel to any country in

















SIGNIFICANT-OTHER MATCHING ON INTEREST- BASED
AND OPINION- BASED COGNITIVE DATA ITEMS
ITEM
What IS the last name of your
favorite actor or actress ^
What IS your favorite flower ^
What IS your favorite dessert ^
What IS your favorite vegetable ^
What IS your favorite fruit ^













SIGNIFICANT-OTHER MATCHING ON INTEREST- BASED





If you could change occupations, which
new occupation would you choose ^ 11 133
What 15 tne nanne of yoy
favorite restaurant ^ 21 25.3
What IS the last nanne of your
favorite college instructor ^ 8 9'6
TABLE 11
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5. Discussion of Findings
a. Recall of Passwords
Over a three-month period, no more than 23.2% of the respondents
could recall their system-generated, assigned passwords. This percentage includes the
nearly two-thirds of the respondents who wrote down their assigned passwords. This
was the case even though the assigned passwords did not exceed seven characters, the
accepted limit to human short-term memory (Miller, 1956).
Over the same period, no more than 35.4% of the same respondents
could recall the passwords that they had created themselves. Again, this maximum
recall included the 14% of the respondents who wrote down their self-generated
passwords.
b. Recall of Cognitive Data
After three months, the respondents recalled, on average, 82% of their
cognitive passwords. None recalled fewer that 13 (65%) of the 20 cognitive passwords.
Over 6% of the respondents recalled all 20 items. When the fact-based cognitive data
items was analyzed separately, the recall averaged over 94%. The recall performance
on the interest-based and opinion-based cognitive data items was somewhat lower than
for the fact-based items. On average, 87.9% of the interest-based and opinion-based
items were recalled.
Recall of the cognitive data items was noticeably better than it was for
either the assigned or self-generated conventional passwords. Overall, the findings in
this study demonstrate an ease of recall for cognitive passwords that is superior to that
of conventional passwords.
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c. Guessing of Cognitive Data
The people who are socially close to the user-respondents (spouses,
close friends and siblings), on average could guess no more than 27% of their users'
cognitive data responses. Only one significant-other could guess as many as 10 out of
20 items. The modal responses were six and seven out of the 20. Four significant-
others could not guess any of their respondents' choices correctly.
When the guessing of fact-based cognitive items were analyzed
separately from interest-based and opinion-based items, the results were as expected.
People close to the user-respondents could guess fact-based items better than they could
guess interest-based or opinion-base items. On average, the significant-others guessed
36.9^f of the fact-based items while averaging only 22.9% for the interest-based and
opinion-based cognitive data.
A test of the notion that people more socially close to user-respondents,
such as spouses, ought to be better guessers than those even slightly removed, such as
close friends and boyfriends or girlfriends showed it to be true. The average number
of correct guesses for spouses was 5.8 (29%) compared to 3.15 (16%) for non-spouse
significant others.
d. Summary
These fmdings demonstrate that while cognitive passwords are easy for




A. STRUCTURE OF THE COGNITIVE PASSWORD SECURITY MODEL
The cognitive password security model encompasses user password
development and a system-generated identification number along with physical security.
Implementation is accomplished through two major modules: system administrator and
user. These two modules support the two main types of participants in this cognitive
password system: a system administrator and one or more users. A brief description of
both the system administrator and the user module follows.
1. System Administrator Module
The system administrator module is protected by three layers of security:
physical security, segregation from other programs and a unique identification number
known only to the system administrator. Access to the system administrator module
will only be granted through the system administrator's terminal located in his or her
office. This layer of physical security requires any unauthorized user to gain access
to the system administrator's office in order to attempt intmsion. Both the system
administrator module and the user module were constructed as separate programs so
that access to one would not grsmt access to the other. A unique identification number
known only to the svstem administrator must be entered into the system upon program
initiation. In summary three conditions must be met in order to gain access to the
system administrator module: access to a particular office, access to the program and
knowledge of the unique identification number.
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Upon initiating the system administrator module, the system administrator
must respond to a query for his or her identification number as illustrated in
Figure 7-1.
PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID NUMBER
FOLLOWED BY <ENTER>
FIGURE 7-1
When the identification number is entered, it is checked to ensure
correctness. If incorrect, an error message is displayed and access is denied. If
correct, the System Administrator Main Menu is displayed with its 6 options as shown
in Figure 7-2.
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SYSTEM ADMIN ISTRAIOP - MAIN MENU
A - Add a new user
M - Modify a users profile
D - Delete a users profile
V - View a users profile
U - Unlock a user's profile
E - Exit from system 1
Select Option
_
and press < ENTER >
FIGURE 7-2
a. Option A - Add a New User
This option is used to add a new user to the cognitive password system.
Upon selection, a random number generator assigns a five digit identification number
to the user. After the user is told his or her identification number, the user through
the system administrator responds to the 20 question database. In addition, the system
administrator sets the account status indicator to active. The status indicator, when set
to active or 1, allows a user to access the user module. If set to frozen or 0, a user
will not be allowed to use the user module. Figure 7-3 shows a sample of a question
display.
76
WHAT IS THE NAME OF THE ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL FROM WHICH YOU GRADUATED '^
PRESS < ENTER > AFTER ENTERING
ANSWER I
FIGURE 7-3
b. Option M • Modify a User's Profile
Modify is used to change an existing profile. When selected, the
system administrator is prompted for a user's identification number. Once a user's
profile is located, the system administrator is prompted for the question number to be
affected by the change. The question, the current answer and a prompt for a new
answer is displayed as shown in Figure 7-4.
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QUESTION 1 :
WHAT 15 THE NAME OF THE ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL FROM WHICH YOU GRADUATED ^
CURRENT ANSWER IS :
ENTER NEW ANSWER - MAXIMUM OF
20 CHARACTERS i
PRESS < ENTER > AFTER ENTERING i
FI(;URE 7-4
c. Option D • Delete a User's Profile
Delete is used to remove a user's profile from the cognitive password
database. Reasons for removal may be that a user no longer requires access or that
a user is no longer associated with the organization. The system administrator selects
the delete option and is prompted for a user's identification number. When the specific
account is located, its identification nnmhpr and its an<;wer database is removed from
the password database as illustrated in Figure 7-5.
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USER PROFILE DELETED '
FIGURE 7-5
d. Option V • View a User's Profile
View is used to display the answer database for a particular user. The
system administrator is prompted for a user's identification number. When located, a
user's entire account is displayed as shown in Figure 7-6. No modifications can be




























e. Option U - Unlock a User's Profile
Unlock is used to change the account status indicator. If the status
indicator is set to 0, the account is frozen and access to the user module is not
allowed. If set to 1, the account is active and access is allowed to the user module.
The account status indicator can be set at three times: when adding a new user, when
modif\'ing the profile of an existing u^pt and when a u<Jer has failed after two attempts
to furnish the appropriate answers to the questions asked in the user module. The
unlock option is used by the system administrator to reactivate an account. When
selected, the system administrator is prompted for a user's identification number. After
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locating a user's file, the current status indicator is displayed along with the option of
changing it as shown in Figure 7-7.
CURRENT STATUS =
__
DO YOU WANT TO CHANGE THE STATUS '?
Y or N
PRESS < ENTER > AFTER SELECTING i
FIGURE 7-7
/. Option E • Exit from System
Exit is used to save all records and exit from the cognitive password
system. When selected, all records are written to the database and the user is asked
if he or she wishes to return to the System Administrator Main Menu. If a user
answers "no", control is returned to the operating system. Figure 7-8 shows the exit
screen.
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ALL RECORDS HAVE BEEN SAVED i
DO YOU WANT TO GO BACK TO THE
MAIN MENU '^ Y or N
PRESS < ENTER > AFTER SELECTING !
FIGURE 7-8
2. User Module
After a user has established his or her account, a user will interface only
with the user module. The only exceptions would be if a user's account is frozen or
if a user desired to modify an answer.
The fu^t test faced by a user attempting to gain access through the user
module is to enter his or her identification number. When entered, the identification
number is checked for correcmess. If incorrect, a user is given additional opportunities
to enter the correct number. If correct, a user proceeds to the question and answer
phase. A maximum of two attempts is allowed before the respective account is frozen.
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a. Attempt One
When a user's identification number is evaluated as correct, he or she
is instructed that five questions will be asked £is shown in Figure 7-9. After this
informational screen is displayed, five randomly selected questions are selected and
displayed one at a time, Figure 7-10. A user responds to each question. After all 5
questions have been answered, the responses are compared to the answers stored in the
answer database. If correct, access is granted. Figure 7-11. If incorrect, access is
denied. Figure 7-12, and the user proceeds to the second attempt. No error messages
are given to indicate if any answers are incorrect. This is a security feature to prevent
a potential intruder from attempting to guess the appropriate answers.
YOU WILL BE ASKED 5 QUESTIONS IN
ORDER TO AUTHENTICATE YOUR ACCESS
PLEASE LIMIT EACH ANSWER TO
20 CHARACTERS .
PRESS THE ESCAPE KEY TO START i
FIGURE 7-9
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WHAT 15 THE NAME OF THE ELEMENTARY
SCHOOL FROM WHICH YOU GRADUATED "^
PRESS < ENTER > AFTER ENTERING i
FIGURE 7-10
ACCESS GRANTED




YOU WILL BE GIVEN ONE MORE
OPPORTUNITY I
PRESS THE ESCAPE KEY TO CONTINUE
FIGURE 7-12
b. Attempt Two
Five questions are randomly selected from the question database.
Safeguards have been built into the cognitive password system to ensure there will be
no duplication of questions between attempt 1 and attempt 2. Each question is asked
in the same fashion as in attempt 1, Figure 7-10. After responses are obtained, each
answer is compared against the respective answers stored in the answer database. If
correct, access is granted, Figure 7-11. If incorrect, four actions occur: access is
denied, the account is frozen by automatically changing the account status indicator
to 0. the user is in<Jtnirtpd to contact the svstem adminif^trator before attempting further




YOU MUST CONTACT THE
SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR IN ORDER TO USE
FIGURE 7-13



















The system administrator is the focal point of a security system. If a system
is large enough, a systems administrator may delegate specific functions to assistants,
such as a systems security manager. While a security manager is primarily responsible
for the security of a computerized system, the system administrator remains overall
responsible. In this discussion and in the following example, a system administrator
retains all responsibilities and therefore, is the primary point of contact.
Initially, a potential user meets with the system administrator in the
administrator's office to start a sequence of events culminating in a user being granted
access to the system as an authorized user. The first order of business is to verify a
user's need to access the information system. Verification should be obtained
independently of a user; i.e., a potential user should not be allowed to furnish his or
her own verification. An ideal scenario is for verification of need to be accomplished
prior to an initial meeting. If unable to do so, a potential user should not be granted
an interview until verification is satisfactory. Proof of need may take various forms:
a written or electronic request from a potential user's department head transmitted
independently of a potential user or a valid organizational identification card matched
with an authorized request such as a validated course enrollment form. After this
initial step is complete, step 2, fjimiliarization with appropriate rules and regulations,
takes place.
A list of do's and don't*; should be compiled in layman's terms. Each
I>otential user should be required to read this list and ask any questions he or she
desires. Once a potential user understand*; the rules and regulations, he or she should
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sign acknowledging understanding and receipt of a copy. Only after the systems
administrator has verified need and is satisfied that the potential user understands the
procedures, should a potential user be recognized as a new user.
At this stage, step 3, the systems administrator will activate the system
administrator module and initiate the user's profile. An identification number is
generated and assigned and the responses to the 20 questions in the question database
are entered into the answer database. Each answer is given verbally, thereby
eliminating the need to commit any answers to paper. By elimination of paper media,
the risk of a user commining any of the answers to writing is reduced. This security
safeguard helps ensure that the password answers will not transition to something
possessed as opposed to something known. Upon completion of this step, a user is
now authorized to use the user module.
Step 4 is the user log-in process. When a user activates a terminal, the
cognitive password system is automatically accessed. A user will be first asked to enter
his or her identification number. If the identification number is not valid, the user will
receive additional opportunities to enter the correct identification number. If correct, the
user win be asked five questions. The responses to these questions are compared to
the stored answers asked at the time the user first initiated his or her profile. If the
answers match, access is granted. If incorrect, the user is asked five additional
questions. Again the responses to the second set of questions are compared to the
stored an<;wers. If correct, access is granted Tf incorrect, access is denied, the account
is frozen and the user is exited from the system. Further use of the computer system
is denied until the unsuccessful user meets with the system administrator.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. YES! THERE IS A BETTER WAY!
In Chapter TV, the question "Is there a better way?" was asked concerning
passwords. The foregoing research confirms that passwords can be made to be more
effective and yield a high degree of security.
1. The Inadequacy of Traditional Passwords
This study outlines the problems found in traditional passwords: hard to
remember, easy to guess, written down on paper, low level of security provided and
user resistance. At the same time that traditional passwords were being criticized, they
remained the most common form of computer access control.
Traditional passwords have not kept up with the rapid advances in
information systems technology. The widespread proliferation of networks and users'
desires to be able to access computer systems from basically anywhere in the world
has caused traditional passwords to fall from favor. While still widely used, users have
decreasing confidence in their capability to provide adequate security. The need to find
a better password has brought password variations such as cognitive passwords to the
forefront.
2. Advantages of Cognitive Passwords
This research has shown that cognitive passwords indeed offer several
advantages over traditional passwords.
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a. User Selection
Cognitive passwords allow a user to select the password. As has been
shown, user selected passwords enjoy a high degree of memorability and low user
resistance. The survey conducted with this study confirms this advantage. Of the test
group, 23.2% could recall the system generated assigned password, 35.4% could recall
the user selected password and 82% could recall their cognitive password. This
marked increase in ability to recall portends well for cognitive passwords.
b. Difficulty of Guessing
A goal of any security system is to deter potential intruders from
attempting to gain entry through guessing. Cognitive passwords demonstrate that
indeed they are difficult to guess. People that are socially close to the user-respondents
could guess only 27% of the cognitive passwords. People that could be assumed to
be the closest to the user-respondents, spouses, fared little better. They could only
guess correctly 29% of the time. The assumption that people not socially close to the
user-respondents, such as friends, would have an even more difficult time in guessing
cognitive passwords were confirmed by this research. Friends could only guess 16%
of the cognitive passwords.
c. Ease of Memorability
The degree of memorability correlates directly with the ease of
guessing. Users tend to select easy to remember passwords, primarily meaningful items
or detaiK TTie classic examples are spouses' names or birthday dates. While easy to
remember, the passwords were unfortunately easy to guess. Little effort is needed to
guess the traditional password. As stated in section (a) above, the marked increase in
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the degree of recall of cognitive passwords compared to system generated or user
selected passwords is significant.
d. Use of Episodic Memory
Research into the development of effective passwords indicate that
passwords based on episodic memory are most effective. The advantage of episodic
memory is that it is based on meaningful details that is mostly unshared with anyone
else. Cognitive passwords are built upon this premise. Unshared memory is more
difficult to guess and would not normally be written down in f>ersonnel files. Barton
(1984) indicated that good formulation produces passwords that are distanced enough
in form from ordinary experience to make compromise unlikely. Cognitive passwords
are based on items and details known normally to the user.
e. Construction
Menkus (1988), Fisher (1983) and Kurzban (1983) listed three
characteristics that directly affected good constmction of passwords: length, character
set and memorability.
(J) Length. TTie longer the password, the more difficult it is to guess,
and therefore the more secure it is (Wood, 1983). A cognitive password system based
on 20 questions each of a maximum length of 20 characters yields a robust base.
(2) Character Set. While passwords constructed of random characters
yield the highest degree of security, practicality dictates character sets that can be
remembered The most common solution to this problem is the addition of vowels to
characters to make the password memorable and therefore easier to use. The larger
the character set. the larger the number of possible combinations. Length coupled with
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the character set determine how robust a password will be. The current implementation
of a cognitive password system has sufficient length and character set to yield a robust,
effective security system.
(3) Memorability. As previously stated, cognitive passwords have
been demonstrated to be easier to recall than either system generated or user selected
passwords. One factor that greatly improves memorability is the ability of a user to
construct his or her own password. As has already been shown, cognitive passwords
take advantage of this user selection. In fact, cognitive passwords combines the
advantages of user selection and a user's innate desire to select meaningful details.
The synergism of user selection and meaningful details yields a rich and effective
password security system.
3. Degree of Security
The degree of security provided by any password system is a function of
user acceptance. If a system is difficult, the system will be either not used or
circumvented. Cognitive password systems offer the advantages of high memorability,
ease of use, user selection and little user resistance.
4. Implementation of a Cognitive Password System
How difficult would a cognitive password system be to implement? As part
of this study, a prototype of such a system was built and implemented. T^e prototype
was coded in Pascal and designed for a stand-alone microcomputer. The system was
found to be easy to understand, inexpensive to implement and ea<?y to maintain.
Adaptation of this prototype to a network, a minicomputer or a mainframe computer
could be accomplished with a minimum of effort.
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5. Summary
Cognitive passwords have been shown to be an effective computer security
mechanism. Ahituv, Lapid and Neumann's evaluation model relative to cognitive
passwords is iUustrated in Figure 8-1.
EVALUAT ON OF THE
COGNTIVE PASSWORD MODEL
CRITERIA MODEL
1. EASILY REMEMBERED ^ YES
2 HARD TO GUESS BY ASSOCIATION '? YES
3 EASY TO KEY- IN ^ YES
A. ATTACKABLE BY SPOOFING
OR TROJAN HORSE ^ YES
5 TESTED ^ YES
6 EASY TO IMPLEMENT '^ YES




This study shows that cognitive password systems can be an effective computer
security mechanism. Further research into cognitive passwords is recommended.
Closely related to cognitive passwords, is the area of associative passwords.
Smith (1987) has conducted preliminary research in this area. Research into how
associative passwords relate to cognitive passwords is recommended.
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APPENDIX
THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE QI - COGNITIVE PASSWORDS
BACKGROUND: The purpose of this questionnaire is to develop a sample database
of appropriate questions and answers to be utilized in developing a prototype of a
cognitive password system.
PART A: PERSONAL INFORMATION





Last four digits of SSN
Number of years experience, if any, in computer usage:
Type of computers) used prior to NFS (check any that apply):
a. Microcomputer
b. Microcomputer linked to a mainframe
c. Mainframe terminal
PART B: PASSWORDS
1. Please construct and write in the space provided below your own password, up to
8 characters (letters and/or numbers). Try to memorize and safeguard it as you would
any other password.
I I I i I I I I I
2. How did you choose your password in (1) above?
a. A meaningful detail (name, date, number, etc.)
b. A combination of meaningful details
c. A randomly chosen combination of characters
d. Other (Please specify)
3. The following password has been assigned to you for this study.
Please memorize and safeguard it as you would any other
password.
I I I I I I I I I
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THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE 01 • COGNITIVE PASSWORDS
Page 2 of 3
PART C: Cognitive Questions For Passwords
Please answer all questions with a maximum of 20 characters.
1. What is the name of the elementary school from which you
graduated ?
2. What is the first name of your favorite uncle ?
3. What is the first name of your best friend in high school?
4. What is your mother's maiden name?
5. What was the first name of your first boyfriend/girlfriend?
6. WTiat was the name of your favorite class in high school?
7. What is the name of your favorite music performer or group*;
8. What is your favorite type of music?
9. What is the name of your favorite vacation place?




What is the last name of your favorite actor or actress?
12. What is your favorite flower?
13. What is your favorite dessen?
14. What is your favorite vegetable?
15. What is your favorite fmit?
16. Wliat is your favorite color?
17. If you could change occupations, which new occupation would you choose?
18. What is the name of your favorite restaurant?
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19. What is the occupation of your father?
20. What is the last name of your favorite college instructor?
OS
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Last four digits of SSN
,
Relationship
n XrKCfROl'ND: The purpose of thh questionnaire is to develop a sample database
of appropriate questions and answers to be utilized in developing a prototyp>e of a
cognitive password system. Please try to answer the following questions REGARDING
THE PERSON WHO GAVE YOU THIS QUESTIONNAIRE, without his/her help.
Please answer the following questions with a maximum of 20 characters. Leave blank
if you don't know the answer !
1. What is the name of the elementary school from which he/she graduated ?
2. What is the first name of his/her favorite uncle ?
3. What is the first name of his/her best friend in high school?
4. What is his/her mother's maiden name?
5. What was the first name of his/her first boyfriend/girlfriend?
6. What was the name of his/her favorite class in high school?
7. What is the name of his/her favorite music performer or group?
8. What is his/her favorite type of music";
9. What is the name of his/her favorite vacation place?
10 Tf he/<;he conid travel to anv co\intr\' in the world, which would
it be?
1 1 . What is the last name of his/her favorite actor or actress?
oo
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12. What is his/her favorite flower?
13. What is his/her favorite dessert?
14. What is his/her favorite vegetable?
15. What is his/her favorite fruit?
16. What is his/her favorite color?
17. If he/she could change occupations, which new occupation would he/she choose?
18. What is the name of his/her favorite restaurant?
19. What is the occupation of his/her father?
20. What is the last name of his/her favorite college instructor?
100
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P \(^KffROrNr): The purpose of tliis questionnaire is to determine how well a person
can remember the answers previously given in the first questionnaire. Please answer
to the best of your ability.
PART A: PERSONAL
Last four digits of SSN
PART B: PASSWORDS
1. Please write in the space below the password you developed and wrote on the first
questionnaire.
2. How did you remember your password in (1) above? Please be honest!
a. Committed to memor\-
b. Wrote on paper
3. On the first questionnaire, you were assigned a password. Please write that password
in the space below.
4. How did you remember your password in (3) above?
a. Committed to memor>'
b. Wrote on paper
PART C: Cognitive Question.s For Passwords
The following questions were asked in the first questionnaire.
Please answer all questions with a maximum of 20 characters.
1 ^^'h.^f i<^ the name of th^^ elementpn- <;rhoo1 from which you graduated
2. What is the first name of your favorite uncle ?
3. Wliat is the first name of your best friend in high school?
lOI
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4. What is your mother's maiden name?
5. What was the first name of your fust boyfriend/girlfriend?
6. What was the name of your favorite class in high school?
7. What is the name of your favorite music performer or group?
8. What is your favorite type of music?
9. What is the name of your favorite vacation place?
10. If you could travel to any country in the world, which would
it be?
11. What is the last name of your favorite actor or actress?
12. What is your favorite flower?
13. What is your favorite dessert?
14. What is your favorite vegetable?
15. What is your favorite fruit?
16. What is your favorite color?
17. If you could change occupations, which new occupation would you choose?
18. What is the name of your favorite restaurant'
19. What is the occupation of your father?
20. What is the last name of your favorite college instructor?
in-
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